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Chapter 5

Congressional Hearings
Immigration Frames in Expert Testimonies

The public’s interest and attention to any political issue can change quickly as
new events drive other concerns to the forefront (Downs, 1996; Baumgartner
& Jones, 1993; Kingdon, 1999). All interested parties in politics are beholden
to a variety of demands on their attention, and the prioritization of public concerns can easily fluctuate (Hunt, 2002; Jones, 1994). For instance, in January
2014, immigration was a concern for about 3 percent of those polled, a small
share compared to the 25 percent of respondents who named government dissatisfaction as the most important problem (Gallup, 2014). By November of
the same year, during the midterm election, 17 percent of Americans named
immigration the most important problem (Gallup, 2014).
At the beginning of 2014, the Obama administration and many Republicans had reached agreement on some elements of immigration reform. In
fact, the Republican Speaker of the House, John Boehner, and the Republican
House Majority Leader, Eric Cantor, had been discussing and advancing a
comprehensive immigration bill to work alongside the Senate bill that had
been passed earlier (Foley, 2014). The approach to immigration reform had
been advancing because reform was seen, by both parties, as a mechanism to
fix the problem of having around 11 million undocumented immigrants in the
United States. (Foley, 2014). The opportunity for immigration reform had all
but ended by the end of July, when a perfect storm of events drew the attention of all interested parties away from “reform” to a new problem, border
security, one that was defined by the restrictionists—those who defeated Eric
Cantor in his primary race in May—and most importantly, by the influx of
tens of thousands of migrant children crossing the border. By the time the
midterm election had taken place, there were as many as 68,000 new undocumented children in the United States (Park, 2014).
97
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The Obama administration asked for about $1.2 billion from Congress
to create detention centers to house the children as they figured out what to
do with them, not wanting to deport them to countries where they might be
harmed. This decision triggered much criticism. Many Republicans charged
that Obama was refusing to enforce the law; the children should be deported.
President Obama tried to frame this incident as a humanitarian response to
the migrants, with some limited success. The migrants’ presence, however,
began to tax the budgets and immigration centers of the states. Moreover, the
Republican Governor of Pennsylvania, Tom Corbett, and other Republican
members of the House of Representatives argued that the increase in migrant
children was more than a humanitarian crisis; it was about national and border security.
Corbett made dubious claims about the children spreading diseases, such
as the measles, swine flu, tuberculosis, and Ebola. He argued that their presence in the United States, and the mechanism by which they entered, was
a threat to the security of our country, saying our borders must be secured
(Lazar, 2014). Naturally, as the migrant child population continued to rise,
the issue of immigration shifted from reform, where Obama and the Republican leadership wanted it, to border security. Therefore, border security and
its connection to immigration policy was front and center in the midterm election, again. And it eliminated any opportunity for policy change.
Such political turbulence complicates policy efforts of decision makers
to control or frame an issue such as immigration (Egan, 2013). The unpredictability of events, how those events are framed, and the attention paid
to the events, present constraints that limit change. Most pertinent issues
are plagued by this reality. Immigration in particular is an intricate policy
domain, wherein multiple contextual factors, new information and events, as
well as competing voices, play a role in shaping issue ownership and policy
outcomes.
This chapter seeks to ascertain how, given the multiple influences, members of Congress and immigration experts frame immigration. Building on
previous chapters, we assume that the post-9/11 authoritarian turn in immigration rhetoric will also be found in the rhetoric of congressional elites
during hearings. We assess how 9/11 functions as a shock to the immigration policy monopoly, wherein the framing nexus of “terrorist” and “border
control” gains a foothold. In building a substantial database on the discussion
of immigration, this study coded remarks from the expert testimonies in congressional hearings from the 103rd Congress (1993–1994) through the 109th
Congress (2005), mapping the framing of immigration rhetoric before and
after 9/11. Rather than determining if congressional attention to immigration
is capable of effecting change in the policy narrative, as an entrepreneurial
mechanism of power, this study provides a discussion on the importance of
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“triggering events” such as 9/11 and the issue expansion in topical policies
such as immigration.
9/11 AND THE AUTHORITARIAN TURN
IN IMMIGRATION POLICY
The United States Senate held a congressional hearing on April 4, 2001,
entitled Immigration Policy: An Overview, wherein the Immigration Subcommittee sought to define immigration policy. This was the last hearing on
immigration the Senate had prior to the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001. The language used in that hearing was not completely positive, but
there were only 11 negative frames out of a total of 280 mentions of immigration. Most of the negativity in the expert testimony focused on the economic
relationships the United States had with other countries and the immigrants
that migrated here for jobs. Seven of the 11 negative frames addressed the
economic threat that immigrants can pose to U.S. workers. Nevertheless, the
hearing was overwhelmingly positive in its assessment of U.S. immigration
policy and immigrants migrating to the United States. The chairman of the
subcommittee, Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS), began the hearing and set
the tone with this opening statement:
America is a nation of immigrants. That is what Ronald Reagan reminded us
of in his first address to the nation. President Reagan saw a vision and always
envisioned America as a shining city on a hill, and in his mind it was a city that
teemed with people of all kinds living in peace and in harmony. Then he said,
“And if this city has walls, the walls have doors, and the doors are open to those
with the energy and the will and the heart to get in. That is the way I saw it,
that is the way I see it.” And that is the way I see it, too … America’s greatest
strength remains in its openness to new ideas and new people. That openness
explains why the United States is powerful, influential, and growing. (Sam
Brownback, April 4, 2001)

The context of this hearing is defined by several factors. It happened before
9/11, Republicans were in control of the Senate, the president was a Republican, overall polarization was on the decline, and the United States had just
entered a recession in April 2001, per the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER), which likely explains the hearing’s emphasis on the supposed economic threat of immigration.
In the first congressional hearing on immigration after 9/11, the Effective
Immigration Controls to Deter Terrorism, both the context of the discussion
and the framing of immigration changed dramatically. The United States
suffered the most catastrophic attack on its homeland since Pearl Harbor in
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December 1941. The Democrats were in control of the Senate (until November 25, 2002). Members of the U.S. Senate, particularly Majority Leader Tom
Daschle (D-SD), were sent Anthrax, a deadly bacterium, through the U.S.
Mail. The major corporate scandal involving Enron was unfolding. The Stock
Market was in a serious downward spiral; the Dow Jones lost 14 percent and
the S&P was down nearly 12 percent a week after 9/11 (Davis, 2011). And,
the war in Afghanistan began with strong support from both parties.
In this first hearing after 9/11, the attempt to expand the immigration
policy narrative from issues of “illegality” and “criminality” and “economic
threats” to include “border security” and “terrorism” begins. Illustrating the
changing tone and context of the immigration policy discussion, Chairman of
the Subcommittee Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) begins the hearing with his
opening statement, wherein we see the beginning of the competition for party
ownership of the issue definition of immigration (Egan, 2013). He states,
We know that there has been some news affecting exposures to anthrax to some
of the staff in our buildings and that is being dealt with very effectively by the
Sergeant at Arms and by the health professionals that have been assigned to deal
with that job. We feel strongly, since immigration issues have important implications in terms of national security and also to terrorism, that it was important
that we move ahead.1
We are dealing as well with the challenges of immigration as well as the challenges in the intelligence community. So all of these make up very important
aspects in dealing with terrorism. It was our judgment that we ought to move
ahead with this hearing.
It is a privilege to chair this hearing today on the critical issue of border
security and its critical importance in preventing terrorism. Strengthening the
security of our borders is an indispensable part of this Nation’s effort to prevent
future terrorist attacks. We must develop policies and enact laws that meet the
serious security threats we face from abroad. (Ted Kennedy, October 17, 2001)

The first congressional hearing after 9/11 clearly showed how Congress was
redefining immigration policy, expanding the issue to include border security
and terrorism. The attempt to expand immigration policy continued into the
next subcommittee hearing on April 12, 2002, The Enhanced Border Security
and Visa Entry Reform Act. The testimony from Robert C. Byrd (D-WV) is
indicative of the strategy to control the conflict over immigration policy and
ascribe policy control and an ownership to the beneficial outcomes of the new
policy to a specific party (McCool, 1998). In other words, by framing immigration policy as a border security issue that mitigates the threat of terrorism,
which is popular with the public, all benefits that result will be associated
with the Democratic or Republican Party, allowing the party to “own” the
issue of immigration and signal to the voters that the outcome of the popular
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policy perspective is the result of the actions of the party in control of the
policy issue. First, however, a bit of context would create a better understanding of the testimony and the interaction between the parties that transpires
after Senator Byrd’s prepared statement, and their attempt to define, control,
and own immigration policy.
Again, this hearing occurs during the short period wherein the Democrats
have control of the Senate (June 6, 2001 to November 25, 2002) and the
chairmanships, which enables them to decide what individuals, groups, and
interests can testify to the subcommittee; therefore, shaping the immigration
narrative and defining the immigration policy image in the hearing. It is also
important to note that this hearing is, in part, the result of Senator Byrd’s
decision not to grant unanimous consent, the previous December, to the passage of The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, which
they were discussing in April.
Senator Byrd objected to the request for unanimous consent to pass the bill
without any hearings or debate on the Senate floor. With total control of each
branch of government, as well as a major national tragedy and terrorist act,
the Republicans could move the legislation forward and control the immigration policy image, while excluding the perspective of the Democratic Party.
Without an opportunity for the Democratic Party to debate, amend, and force
Republicans to compromise on the details of the bill, the public would simply
perceive the border security and terrorist mitigation efforts as the work of the
Republican Party.
Senator Byrd’s decision was, in part, based on his intention to frame
immigration policy and its connection to border security in a manner that
is also beneficial to Democrats, while highlighting the deficiencies of the
Republican Party’s ideological commitments to border security and terrorist
mitigation, as it is being discussed in the hearing. It is an ideological fight by
the parties for immigration policy control. Each party wants ownership over
border security and its new connection to immigration policy. It is a popular
policy, and one that involves governmental action that produces money for
certain districts. It also represents a successful talking point that exemplifies
the effectiveness of the party. To illustrate our argument, Byrd maintains,
The September 11 attacks showcased the gaps in our border defenses. … I
firmly believe that the Senate needs to pass legislation to tighten our immigration and border security laws. I devoted a large amount of my time and resources
last fall to that very goal. I crafted a $15 billion homeland defense package as
part of the economic stimulus bill the Senate considered last November. That
homeland defense package provided $1.1 billion for border security initiatives,
many of which are included in the border security bill that we are discussing
today. Under a Presidential veto threat—let me underline that, under a veto
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threat by President Bush [a Republican], those funds were removed from the
economic stimulus package by a partisan vote on a budgetary point of order, and
every Republican on this committee supported that point of order to knock out
that money. Not a single Republican stood with us [Democrats] in my effort to
fund border security then and there, not one. … Because that point of order—we
were not able to get the 60 votes to override it because the Republicans, to the
man and woman, voted against it. We could have done things then. But every
Republican on this committee voted against us [Democrats]. (Robert C. Byrd,
April 12, 2002)

Senator Byrd continues this line of thought, framing the issue of border security and the failings of the United States in maintaining safe, secure borders
on the political obstructionism of the Republican Party. He develops the
notion that the Democrats are willing now, and have been willing in the past,
to devote political capital, political will, and substantial amounts of money
to the issue of border security—arguing that the Republicans want to vote in
the affirmative for border security without voting for the money necessary to
secure the borders. He states, emphatically, that Republicans have not been
willing to do this, arguing that not one Republican voted for the money and
the Republican President Bush threatened to veto the bill. In other words,
they are not the party of border security, but rather the Democrats are the
owners of the border security issue in immigration policy. His fear is that the
Republicans would pass the bill and go home to their states and claim that
they “fixed” the problem, which makes them the party of border security.
Senator Byrd continues,
When I tried to get money before we went out of session, not a single Republican
on this committee supported me, not one. At the time, I was told that a window
of opportunity had opened to pass this legislation and that in the aftermath of
the September 11 attacks, a united coalition, Democrats and Republicans, would
support this authorization bill. Yes, they [Republicans] were willing to support
the authorization bill, good to pass that, pass it by unanimous consent, go back
home and say we have taken care of the problem, we passed an authorization
bill. But not one, not one Republican—I am sorry to have to be so strong in my
statement here in this regard. I very seldom criticize members of the other party,
but I think I have a right to in this instance. … And then some of the members
of this committee implored me, pleaded with me to agree to unanimous consent
to pass this authorization bill. They could go home then [with complete unified
party government]. They could say, oh, yes, we passed that. But when it comes
to the money, I wanted to face these Republicans and say, are you going to vote
for the money [the real measures necessary to fix the border security problem]?
(Robert C. Byrd, April 12, 2002)
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The contrast between the pre-9/11 and post-9/11 hearings is indicative of
the fundamental argument in this book, namely, an act of extreme terrorism
helped to redefine and expand, by adding a new framework, the authoritarian
approach to immigration policy in American political affairs. The 9/11 attack
refocused the attention of government on immigration, expanding the policy
image to include the issue of border security, along with illegality, criminality, and economic threats. The United States went from spending $1.055 billion in 2000 to $3.531 billion in 2012, which is about a 235 percent increase
in funding in just over a decade (Graham 2013).
However, this immigration policy issue expansion does not replace the
dominant “illegal” framing nexus, but rather offers terrorism and border
security a place in the rhetorical palette of elite authoritarian discourse in congressional hearings. The effects of 9/11 and the immigration issue expansion
set off a competition between the Republican and Democratic parties to own
the issue of immigration and its connections to border security and terrorist
mitigation. Moreover, the ownership of the post-9/11 immigration policy also
gave the party the reputation of being the protector of national security in the
face of terrorism and immigration dangers, a strategic electoral advantage.
Republicans eventually ended up “owning” the issue, but the Democrats were
fighting for ownership directly after 9/11, as illustrated above. In fact, as Egan
(2013) notes, the issue of immigration was the second most important policy
priority the public had for both the president and the Congress in 2008 and
the most important one by 2011.
It is important to note here that the congressional committees established
by members of congress create policy monopolies through their stronghold
on the policy turfs; the committees are a subsystem of limited participation
(Worsham, 2006). Only those persons invited by the majority party can
participate in the hearings. The control of the policy turf can create policy
monopolies, wherein the image of the policy is completely controlled by
a limited group of participants and access to that policy-making system of
power is restricted by those in control, elected officials in this case (Worsham, 2006).
The interesting aspect of this shift in the immigration issue definition, however, is that there is very little resistance to including “terrorism” and “border
security” in the immigration conversation, but rather the competition is more
closely identified with party ownership of the idea. This is precisely why
Democrats, in the limited amount of time they are in control of the Senate
after 9/11, hold hearings when they know their control is limited in duration.
In other words, there were no arguments about the overall policy image of
immigration wherein one would say it is solely about “illegality” or “refugees,” as it had been in the past, but rather it appears that including “border
security” and “terrorism” as policy images for immigration are a foregone
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conclusion by many of the voices in the elite discourse on immigration. The
expansion of the authoritarian turn in the immigration policy image in Congress can be seen in nuanced rhetoric from the elite experts in the hearings.
These differentiations are more apparent from those that are from border
states or those states with high immigrant populations and migrant worker
economies, however. Nevertheless, the reality is that after 9/11 the dominant
immigration policy monopoly is one of negativity and authoritarianism.
DATA AND SOURCES
The number of hearings on immigration policy have ranged from nearly
70 in the 80th Congress (1947–1949) to just above 20 hearings in the 82nd
Congress (1951–1953). This dramatic rise and fall remains until the 95th
Congress (1977–1979), wherein it hovers around 75 hearings until it drops
off to under 10 hearings in the 98th Congress (1981–1983). There has been
a steadier increase in the number of hearings through the 103rd Congress
(1993–1995). Compared to the Senate, the House of Representatives has been
a bit more consistent in the number held, dropping below 65 hearings only
in the 86th Congress (1959–1961) and the 89th through the 91st Congresses
(1963–1969). The fluctuation in the number of Senate hearings is indicative
of the competition in immigration policy; as the majority and minority power
changes, each group schedules hearings so as to frame the policy discussion
in ways that benefit their party (Hunt, 2002).
Our study is interested in what was said during these hearings and who said
it (Hunt, 2002). For this reason, we differentiated congressional testimonies
by elected officials, government bureaucrats, and interest groups. We choose
to analyze the hearings from the 104th Congress to the 109th Congress
(1995–2005), giving us, a few years before 9/11 and a few years after this
consequential event. As Theriault (2013) argued, this is a period when both
the Senate and House are polarized. During this period, typically referred to
as the Republican Revolution, the Republican Party’s Contract with America
was formalized, uniting the party and polarizing the Senate (Theriault &
Rohde, 2011). The Republicans took control of both the House and the Senate during this time, after years of Democratic Party control and polarization
began to increase.
We choose to ignore the House Hearings for theoretical reasons and took
a statistically appropriate approach to narrowing down the number of Senate
hearings (Garand, 2010; Lee, 2008; McTague & Pearson-Merkowitz, 2013).
We would expect intense polarization and competition for control of immigration policy in the House, more so than in the Senate, as other research
suggests (Theriault & Rohde, 2011; Poole & Rosenthal, 1984; Schickler,
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2000; Finocchiaro, & Rohde, 2008; Eilperin, 2007). Focusing exclusively on
hearings in the Senate allows us to make a unique contribution to immigration
policy analysis. As Theriault and Rohde (2011) maintain, most studies have
examined the House because the rules of that body encourage polarization
and those of the Senate foster a more “equalitarian” approach to policy making. Yet, because the Senate has become more polarized since the Republican
Revolution, more studies need to focus on the Senate exclusively to expand
our institutional understanding of the Senate’s impact on policy, especially
on a contentious, polarizing issue like immigration. As discussed earlier, we
expect that House members will be strongly in favor of or against various
immigration ideologies, as they represent specific, localized economies and
constituencies; the senators represent a larger, more diverse constituency that
better reflects the views and attitudes of their entire state. Therefore, a shift
in the rhetoric of the Senate hearings would be more representative of an
authoritarian turn on immigration policy in society.
In addition, following a sharp decline, the number of Senate immigration
hearings increased back to the level of 1985. As Figure 5.1 illustrates, there
is a drop in hearings in 1999 and 2000, which indicates that the immigration
policy image is established and not at risk for a challenge from the other party
(MacLeod, 2002). The fact that there is a dramatic increase in hearings after
9/11 in 2001 is indicative of the challenge to the established immigration
policy image and the competition for party ownership of that issue.
The increase in hearings remains steady until 2006 when the Democrats
take control of the Senate, leading us to speculate that party and issue ownership has a significant effect here. Not only is each chamber vying for control
of immigration policy, we can also see an attempt made by the Republican
Party to elevate this issue at the beginning of their Revolution and maintain

Figure 5.1 Number of Senate hearings on immigration 1985–2013. Source: The data
used for this figure are from the Policy Agendas Project data set. It provides a visual,
detailed picture of the total number of Congressional Hearings in the U.S. Senate differentiated by year, which is represented by the X-axis in this figure. The Y-axis shows the
breakdown of the congressional hearings by the start year of the congressional session.
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it throughout their time in the majority as they get more seats in the 2002
midterms, an effect of 9/11 (Hunt, 2002).
To obtain transcripts of the hearings pertaining to immigration, one cannot simply use a key word search to identify hearings by topic. The word
“immigration” is often mentioned in hearings that have nothing to do with
immigration per se. Therefore, to ascertain the number of hearings that specifically address immigration we went to the Policy Agendas Project and
utilized their data, as it is accepted in the scholarly community. As Figure
5.1 shows, there were 59 hearings in the Senate from 1995 through 2005.
Our next challenge was to narrow down the number of hearings and select
a manageable sample (Cook, Barabas & Page, 2002). Our search led us to
the Library of Congress (LOC), which houses a large collection of congressional hearings digitized in a searchable format. Partnering with Google,
the LOC has collected every congressional hearing in existence. As part of
a test experience, the LOC and Google selectively compiled a sample of
hearings in three areas: Census U.S., Freedom of Information/Privacy, and
Immigration. Thus, we had each Senate hearing from 1995 through 2005 in
a searchable document.
Mentions of “immigration” number in the tens of thousands for all hearings in the Senate, especially when you consider all stem forms of the word
“immigra.” Trying to ascertain each relevant stem word and code it appropriately is unnecessary and burdensome (Woods & Arthur, 2014; Arthur
& Woods, 2013; Hopkins & King, 2010). To reduce the impracticality of
analyzing the entire population of congressional mentions of “immigra,” we
coded every mention of the term “immigration” in our sample of congressional hearings to create a database of elite discourse that extends around
five years before and after 9/11 (Woods & Arthur, 2014; Arthur & Woods,
2013; Lohr, 2010; Barrett & Eshbaugh-Soha, 2007; Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000;
Spriggs, 1996; Barrett, 2004; Peterson, 1990). There were 1,989 mentions of
immigration, our unit of analysis, in the 18 hearings we read and coded (See
Table 5.1).
As discussed in previous chapters, the codebook used for this project is
aimed at detecting the use of four negative immigration frames, including
illegality, criminality, terrorism, and economic threats (Cameron, 2000; Barrett, 2005; Barrett, 2004; Woods & Arthur, 2014; Arthur & Woods, 2013).
In addition to coding the negative frames, we coded several social identifiers
that are often used in the context of the immigration debate, such as the
country of origin (Mexican/Hispanic, Arab, and so forth). Following previous
studies, we took the closest coding trigger to the thought regarding “immigration” (Arthur & Woods, 2013; Arthur, 2014). We are highly confident in the
reliability of our human coding procedure (for a detailed discussion of the
inter-coder reliability, see chapter 3).
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Coded Senate Hearings on Immigration 1995–2005
Extracted from the Library of Congress

May 10, 1995
Oct. 2, 1996
May 1, 1997
July 17, 1997
Dec. 17, 1997
April 14, 1999
Oct 21, 1999
April 4, 2001
Oct 17, 2001
Feb. 12, 2002
Feb. 28, 2002
April 12, 2002
March 12, 2003
July 29, 2003
March 23, 2004
April 1, 2004
Sep 21, 2004
April 28, 2005

Verification of Applicant Identity for Purposes of
Employment and Public Assistance
Immigration and Naturalization Oversight
INS Oversight: The Criminal Record Verification Process
for Citizenship Applicants
The Visa Waiver Pilot Program
Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act
The Kosovo Refugee Crisis
America’s Workforce Needs in the 21st Century
Immigration Policy: An Overview
Effective Immigration Controls to Deter Terrorism
Empty Seats in a Lifeboat: Are There Problems With the
U.S. Refugee Program?
The Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act
The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act
Border Technology: Keeping Terrorists out of the United
States
L1 Visa and American Interests in the 21st Century Global
Economy
United States and Mexico: Immigration Policy and the
Bilateral Relationship
Securing Our Borders Under A Temporary Guest Worker
Proposal
Refugees: Seeking a Solution to a Global Concern
Strengthening Border Security Between the Ports of Entry:
The Use of Technology to Protect the Borders

EMPIRICAL MODEL
We used a regression analysis to facilitate our understanding of the authoritarian shift in elite immigration discourse after 9/11 and help us make sense
of those changes in relation to this dramatic shock to the political system.
The model also reveals how and when important social identifiers are used
by elites in the immigration debate. The analyses provided predicted probabilities and odds ratios for the use of negative frames in our 1,989 units of
analysis. Table 5.6 presents the coefficients, standard errors, and the measures
of significance.
Variables
Our exploratory look at the data revealed that the primary participants in
the process were 1) Senators, the other members of Congress, and other
various elected officials invited to testify at the hearings; 2) interest groups,
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whose mission is connected and vested in U.S. immigration policies; and
3) unelected bureaucrats charged with the government operations of the
immigration apparatus. Each of these experts played an important role in the
messages presented in the hearings. For this reason, when breaking down the
mentions of immigration, we differentiated each statement by source (elected
officials, non-elected bureaucrats, or interest groups) (See Table 5.2).
The invitation of interest groups and politicians serves more than the need
for expert information (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998; Kersh, 2006). The mere
presence of certain political actors is a powerful symbol that can mobilize
a specific set of ideas (Chock, 1991; Talbert, Jones, & Baumgartner, 1995;
Birkland, 1998). Their presence and testimony represents the will of the
people and offers legitimacy to whatever idea about immigration is presented.
Moreover, they represent the concerns about and the solutions to the problems associated with the states the elected officials represent. Theoretically,
each member of congress is concerned with making good policy and their
own reelection, which leads them to use the committee system and congressional hearings to garner attention to an issue and define or redefine that issue
during the hearings (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000; Fenno, 1978; Mayhew, 1989).
See Table 5.3 for a list of those “expert” politicians who testified in the time
of our analysis and Table 5.4 for a list of those interest groups that testified.
The non-elected bureaucrats are invited to offer their institutional knowledge of immigration. Their presence is required to illustrate the problems
with the functional mechanics of the governmental immigration apparatus.
Depending on the policy image desired by the majority party, the non-elected
bureaucrats are there to offer reassurance that the bureaucracy can handle
whatever solution or problem the Congress presents to them. Interest groups
have been an indispensable component of American politics. Their presence
in congressional hearings grants legitimacy to their cause and the causes of
those members who invite them to testify. Their testimonies, and any particular points of information, are important, but also their presence represents
Table 5.2 Bivariate Relationships between Immigration Frames and Elite Discourse of
Expert Testimonies in Congressional Hearings
Bureaucrats n / %
Terrorism
Criminality
Illegality
Economic Threat
No Frames
Total Number of
Statements from Experts
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Officials n / %

Interest Groups
n/%

9/2
12/3
56/14
13/3
324/78

41/7
5/1
92/16
15/2
432/74

34/4
13/1
64/7
24/3
818/85

414/100

585/100

953/100
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Table 5.3

Testimony of Elected Officials and their Immigration Philosophy1

Elected Official
Benjamin Cayetano
(Gov. HI)
Barbara Boxer
D-CA
Bob Miller (Gov.
NV)
Neil Abercrombie
(Rep.HI)
Charles Grassley
(R-IA)
Christopher Dodd
(D-CT)
Chuck Hagel
(R-NE)
Larry Craig (R-ID)
Daniel Inouye
(D-HI)
Dianne Feinstein
(D-CA)
Frank Murkowski
(R-AK)
Jay Kim (Rep. CA)
John Cornyn (R-TX)
John McCain
(R-AZ)
Jon Corzine (D-NJ)
Jon Kyl (R-AZ)
Maria Cantwell
(D-WA)
Mazie Hirono (Lt.
Gov. HI)
Orrin Hatch (R-UT)
Patrick Leahy
(D-VT)
Bill Clinton
(D- POTUS)
Lincoln Diaz-Balart
(R-Rep. FL)
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
(R-Rep. FL)
John Conyers, Jr.
(D-Rep. MI)
Richard Durbin
(D-IL)
Richard Lugar
(R-IN)

Border State

Hispanic
Population

Economic Expansion

No

7.3%–8.9%

Reformist

Yes

25.8%–37.6%

Economic Expansion

No

10.4%–26.5%

Security

No

7.3%–8.9%

Restrictionist/Security

No

1.2%–5.0%

Security: Border/Economic

No

6.5%–13.4%

Reformist

No

2.3%–9.2%

Restrictionist
Economic Expansion

No
No

5.3%–11.2%
7.3%–8.9%

Illegality Problem

Yes

25.8%–37.6%

Economic Expansion

No (Borders
Canada)
Yes
Yes
Yes

Immigration Philosophy

Economic Expansion
Restrictionist
Restrictionist
Security
Security: Border/Economic
Reformist/Refugees

3.2%–5.5%
25.8%–37.6%
25.5%–37.6%
18.8%–29.6%

No
Yes
No (Borders
Canada)
No

9.6%–17.7%
18.8%–29.6%
4.4%–11.2%

4.9%–13.0%
0.7%–1.5%

Refugee Protections

No
No (Borders
Canada)
(n/a) US

Refugee Protections

No

12.2%–22.5%

Illegality/Criminality

No

12.2%–22.5%

Refugee Protections

No (Borders
Canada)
No

7.9%–15.8%

No

1.8%–6.0%

Economic Expansion
Border Security
Reformist

Reformist: Border/Economic
Sec.
Security: Border/Economic

7.3%–8.9%

9%–16.3%

2.2%–4.4%

(Continued)
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Chapter 5
Testimony of Elected Officials and their Immigration Philosophy1 (Continued)

Elected Official
Spencer Abraham
(R-MI)
Alan K. Simpson
(R -WY)
Bob Graham (D-FL)
Charles Robb
(D-VA)
Charles Schumer
(D-NY)
Ted Kennedy
(D-MA)
Mike DeWine
(R-OH)
Robert C. Byrd
(D-WV)
Sam Brownback
(R-KS)
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
(R-Rep. FL)
Saxby Chambliss
(R-GA)
Stephen Horn
(R-Rep. CA)
Jeff Sessions (R-AL)
Tom Coburn (R-OK)
Tony Knowles
(Gov-AK)

Immigration Philosophy
Reformist: Illegality

Border State

Hispanic
Population

Reformist: Processes

No (Borders
Canada)
No

Refugee Protections
Reformist/Restrictionist

No
No

12.2%–22.5%
2.6%–7.9%

Refugee Protections

12.3%–17.6%

Reformist/Security

No (Borders
Canada)
No

Restrictionist: Security
Reformist
Border Security

No (Borders
Canada)
No

1.3%–3.1%

Border Security

No

3.8%–10.5%

Refugee Protections

No

12.2%–22.5%

Border Security

No

1.7%–8.8%

Illegality: Government Doc.

Yes

25.8%–37.6%

Restrictionist
Restrictionist

No
No
No (Borders
Canada)

Economic Expansion

2.2%–4.4%
5.7%–8.9%

4.8%–9.6%

0.5%–1.2%

0.6%–3.9%
2.7%–8.9%
3.2%–5.5%

* These Immigration philosophy indicators do not perfectly reflect the coding we used for the statistical
analysis, but rather are qualitative descriptions of the overall theme of their testimonies to the Congress
in the data set we analyzed. We are aware that these figures can and do change their perspectives of
immigration over time. Our assessments are for the time frame 1995–2005. For the statistical analysis we
used an epidemiological approach and only coded negative frames.

a specific idea of a group or highlights their presence for symbolic reasons
(Diermeier, & Feddersen, 2000). Moreover, the groups picked are typically
highly organized and possess access to monies, which facilitates in the
Senators’ attempt to advance the immigration policy image desired (Leyden,
1995). See Table 5.5 for a list of those non-elected bureaucrats who testified
in the time of our analysis.
In the model, we regressed our dependent variable, whether or not there was
negative immigration frame, on our key independent variable (before or after
9/11), giving us a predicted probability of the effect of the 9/11 on the framing of immigration rhetoric. We also controlled for other variables, including
the type of immigration expert, the geographical locations of the expert (e.g.,
borders Mexico), and the social identifiers connected to the immigrants or
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Table 5.4 Interest Groups Testifying in Congressional Hearings, differentiated by Year
and Lobbying Mission
Interest Group (Yr. Testified)
AFL-CIO (1995)
American Occupational Therapy Assoc. (1995)
American Business Legal Immigration (1995)
The Technology Network (1995)
Western Governors Association (1997)
National Council of Agriculture Empl. (1995)
American Electronics Association (1995)
Private Attorney/Former Senate Council (1995)
CA Department of Motor Vehicles (1995)
Institute of Electrical & Electronics, INC (1995)
Olympus Group (1995)
Coalition for Fair Empl, Silicon Valley (1995)
DMV, Maryland (1995)
Mexican Legal Defense & Edu (1995&2004)
KPMG Peat Marwick LLP (1997)
Airports Council International (1997)
Amnesty International (1997)
Governmental Accountability Office (1997)
Honduran Unity (1997)
National Governors Association (1997)
Florida Immigration Advocacy Center (1997)
Air Transport Association of America (1997)
Archbishop of Miami (1997)
Center for Protection of Women, Kosovo (1999)
Biometric Industry Association (2001)
National Council of La Raza (2001)
American Immigration Lawyers Assoc. (2001)
Cato Institute (2001)
Pricewaterhouse-Coopers (2001)
Nat. AsianPacific Ameri. Legal Consort. (2001)
U.S. Conference of Bishops (2002)
Fraternal Order of Police (2002)
Latham and Watkins (2002)
American Federation of Gov. Emp. (2002)
Chicago Bar Legislative Committee (2002)
Unaccompanied Child, Foreign Country (2002)
Lawyers Commt. for Civil Rights (2002)
U.S. Committee for Refugees (2002)
Families of September 11, 2001 (2002)

Lobbying Mission
Lobbying for Union/Labor
Lobbying for Occupational Therapy
Lobbying Group for Immigration
Lobbying Group for Technology
Bipartisan Lobbying Group of
Govern.
Trade Association for Agriculture
Trade Assoc. for Technology
Industry
Technology Frauds in Govern.
Docs.
Frauds in Govern. Docs.
Trade Association for Electronics
Business Lobby Group
Trade Assoc. for Employees
Frauds in Govern. Docs.
Legal Information Provider
Legal Information Provider
Trade Association for Airports
International Civil Rights
Organization
U.S. Government Agency
Information Provider
Network of U.S. Governors
Legal Information Provider
Trade Association for Air Transport
Religious Information Provider
NGO Protecting Refugees
Trade Association for
BioTechnology
Civil Rights Organization
Legal Information Provider
Think Tank
Legal Information Provider
Legal Information Provider
Religious Information Provider
Trade Association for Law
Enforcement
Legal Information Provider
Federal Employee Union
Legal Information Provider
Personal Interest Story
Civil Rights Organization
Resettling Refugees Organization
Nonprofit supporting the deceased
of 9/11
(Continued)
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Table 5.4 Interest Groups Testifying in Congressional Hearings, differentiated by
Year and Lobbying Mission (Continued)
Interest Group (Yr. Testified)
Lobbying Mission
U.S. Chamber of Commerce (2002)
American Civil Liberties Union (2002)
Refugee Women and Children (2002)
American Council on Intern. Personnel (2003)
Systems Staffing Group (2003)
Adjunct Professor of Law, Cornell (2003)
Global Personnel Alliance (2003)
The Migration Policy Institute (2004)
Federation for Immigration Reform (2004)
American Immigration Law Foundation (2004)
Adjunct Professor of Law, Univ. GA (2004)
Latin Studies at Georgetown Univ. (2004)
Council on Foreign Relations (2004)
Refugee Council USA (2005)
Haitian Refugee Homestead, FL (2005)
Pew Hispanic Center (2005)

Business Lobby Group
Civil Rights Organization
NGO Protecting Refugees
Employer Network
Business Provider
Information Provider
Forum of Companies Concerned
about Immigration
Think Tank
Nonprofit trying to Reduce Illegal
Immigration
Public Charity
Information Provider
Information Provider
Think Tank, providing information
NGO Protecting Refugees
Resettling Refugees
Provides Statistical and Survey
Information

immigration mentioned (e.g., Hispanic, Arab). We also included measures of
congressional control to ascertain how the make-up of government and party
control shaped immigration rhetoric (namely, we used variables for divided
government, party control of senate, and an election year variable).
Statistical Findings
To find the predicted probability of the specific indicators on the presence of
negative frames in congressional hearings between 1995 and 2005, a Logistic
Regression Analysis was performed. The model, overall, is in line with our
theory. The presence of negative immigration frames in congressional hearings increased after 9/11, holding all other variables constant. A one-unit
change in the period, before/after 9/11, makes a significant difference in the
frequency of negative immigration frames. The odds of a negative frame
occurring after 9/11 increases by a factor of 5.438, which is a 443.8 percent
change in odds. Our research suggests that it is significantly more likely that
congressional hearings after September 11, 2001, will have a negative immigration frame, as illustrated in Figure 5.2. This finding was highly significant,
both statistically and in terms of the magnitude of the odds ratio.
In our analysis of the hearings, the dynamics of congressional government
and its relation to the immigration policy image had a significant impact. It
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Table 5.5 Non-Elected Bureaucrats Testifying in Congressional Hearings and the
Negative Frames they use in their testimonies, differentiated by Year and Agency
Bureaucrat (Yr.
Testified)

Immigration Frames

Agency

James A. Puelo
(1995)
Steven L. Pomerantz
(1995)

Illegality

Robert H. Rasor
(1995)
Jack Scheidegger
(1995)
Richard E. Jackson
(1995)
William Florence
(1995)
Mary Ryan (1997)
Michael Bromwich
(1997)
Michael Cronin
(1997)
Richard Stana (1997)

Illegality

Immigration & Naturalization
(INS)
Federal Bureau of
Investigation (Criminal
Justice)
Secret Service

No Frames

Department of Justice (CA)

No Frames

Department of Motor
Vehicles (NY)
Department of Motor
Vehicles (NY)
State Department
Department of Justice

Stephan Colgate
(1997)
Julia V. Taft (1999)
James Ziglar (2001)

No Frames

Lino Gutierrez (2001)
Michael Creppy
(2002)
Stewart Anderson
(2002)
Asa Hutchinson
(2003)
Robert C. Bonner
(2004)
Roger Noriega (2004)

Illegality
No Frames

Arthur Dewey (2004)

No Frames

Eduardo Aguirre
(2004)
Stewart Verdery
(2004)
David Aguilar (2005)

Every Frame

Dr. Kirk Evans (2005)

No Frames

Illegality

No Frames
No Frames
Criminality
Terrorism/Illegality
No Frames

No Frames
Criminality

Illegality
Illegality
Illegality/Criminality
Illegality/Criminality

Every Frame
Illegality/Criminality

Immigration & Naturalization
(INS)
Government Accountability
Office (GAO)
Department of Justice
State Department
Immigration & Naturalization
(INS)
State Department
Executive Office for
Immigration Review
Immigration & Naturalization
(INS)
Homeland Security (Border
Patrol)
Homeland Security (Border
Protection)
State Department (Western
Hemisphere)
State Department (Refugees)
Homeland Security
(Immigration)
Homeland Security (Border
Security)
Homeland Security
(Immigration)
Homeland Security
(Continued)
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Table 5.5 Non-Elected Bureaucrats Testifying in Congressional Hearings and the
Negative Frames they use in their testimonies, differentiated by Year and Agency
(Continued)
Bureaucrat (Yr.
Testified)

Immigration Frames

Gilbert C. Fisher
(2005)
Doris Meissner
(2007)

Agency

No Frames

Social Security Administration

Illegality/Economic Threat

Immigration & Naturalization
(INS)

Table 5.6 Predicting the Presence of a Negative Immigration Frame in Congressional
Hearings, 1995–2005
Dependent Variable: Pr (Success = 1)
N = 1989
Log Likelihood

Wald χ² = 311.36 (p < .0000)
Robust
Standard
Errors

Odds
Ratios

Percent
Change in
Odds

1.693
1.285
.8394
-.9059
-1.338
-.4687
1.913
1.382

5.438
3.615
2.315
.4042
.2625
.6258
6.776
3.983

443.8%
261.5%
131.5%
-59.6%
-73.8%
-37.4%
577.6%
298.3%

.000
.000
.059
.022
.000
.009
.000
.000

.4821
.3117
.4445
.3953
.3790
.1786
.5216
.3942

.3159
2.135
.8967
1.306
2.502

1.372
8.456
2.451
3.692
12.211

37.1%
745.6%
145.1%
269.2%
1121.1%

.243
.000
.172
.000
.000

.2705
.4016
.6568
.1519
.2661

-1.267

.2817

-71.8%

.014

.5167

Coefficients
Period
Border’s Mexico
Elected Official
Bureaucrat
Interest Group
Election Year
Republican Senate
Divided
Government
Hispanic Identity
Arab Identity
Asian Identity
Reform Rhetoric
DC based Speaker
Terrorism/HS
Subcommittee

- 763.95766
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Figure 5.2 The probability of a negative immigration frame in the expert testimony during a
congressional hearing, 1995–2005. Source: The data used for this figure are coded by the authors
from all Senate congressional hearings on immigration from 1995–2005. It provides a visual,
detailed picture of the probability of a negative immigration frame existing before and after 9/11.
AQ: Repeti-

is one of the most important variables and contributes to the research. Our tion of text is
results indicate that the party that is in control of the Congress, as well as to be avoided.
whether there is a divided government, particularly between congressional The text
control and presidential control, has a significant effect on the presence of “the party
that is in
negative immigration frames in the testimonies of expert witnesses. There control of the
were more negative frames in congressional hearings after 9/11 during Congress…
Republican control of the Senate (246) than in Democratic control of the Sen- of negative
ate (44). Moreover, when Republicans are in control of the Senate, the pres- immigration
frames” in the
ence of a negative frame in the hearing increases by a factor of 6.776, which sentence “Our
is a 577.6 percent change in odds, as seen in Table 5.6; it is highly significant. results indiWe maintain that the increase in frames and the inclusion of a new “ter- cate that …”
rorism” frame is specifically about party control and defining and connect- is a verbatim
repetition of
ing immigration policy with border security. The authoritarian approach to text found in
immigration is present in congressional hearings prior to 9/11, but it is signifi- chapter 4, two
cantly increased after 9/11. As we discussed earlier, the competition for issue paragraphs
ownership of immigration is not about issue redefinition in the classic sense, above the
conclusion.
but rather it is about adding a new negative frame to the nexus by which we Please condiscuss immigration, namely, terrorism and border security. This new frame- sider parawork is advocated by the elected officials, mostly from the Republican Party phrasing the
leadership in the Senate and the other elected officials they invite to testify, same.
as illustrated in Table 5.3
After 9/11, there is a significant difference in the negativity regarding immigration in the rhetoric of elected officials. In fact, the negativity
increased by a factor of 2.315. The terrorism and border security frame is not
coming from the non-elected bureaucrats or the interest groups, as indicated
by our regressions. Statistically, the non-elected bureaucrats and the interest groups, in their testimony, holding all other variables constant, are more
negative before 9/11 and when Republicans control the Senate. Democrats
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use this negative frame after 9/11, and invite experts who use it, when they
are in control of the Senate, but it is not statistically significant. It is, however, highly significant when Republicans use it when they are in control and
determine which experts testify.
These two “expert witness” groups continue to offer a negative policy
image of immigration after 9/11, wherein the non-elected bureaucrats
employed 56 negative frames and the interest groups used 115 negative
immigration frames after 9/11, both of which are an increase in the number
frames after 9/11. Moreover, we know that the groups were utilized by the
Senate and the Republican leadership to employ the illegality, economic
threat, and criminality frames prior to 9/11. We maintain that the Republican
leadership allowed these groups to testify as a mechanism of maintaining
the current immigration policy image, one of negativity, as they did prior to
9/11. As discussed earlier, there is no attempt to replace the existing negative
frames of illegality, criminality, and economic threats after 9/11, but rather an
attempt to continue those discussions in order to place the new framework of
terrorism and border security alongside them, creating a larger authoritarian
framing nexus.2
Our results also suggest that it is more likely that the geographical location/
state matters in the frequency of negative immigration frames. If the expert
testifying is from a state that borders Mexico, they will use more negative
frames than if they are from a state that does not. In other words, for every
one-unit change the odds of it being negative toward immigrants increase by
a factor of 3.615, which is a 261.5 percent change in the odds. As would be
expected, expanding immigration policy to include border security engenders
a greater concern for people in states that border Mexico, which is probably
why they were invited to testify.
Moreover, we were curious if the social identification of the immigrant
mentioned made any difference in the likelihood that a negative frame would
be used. Our analysis found that the results are mixed in the congressional
hearings. Overall, however, we find that the expert witness testimony is less
likely to include specific social identifiers with specific negative immigration
frames; this is a different result from the chapter on presidential rhetoric. The
social identification of “Arab” does make a significant difference in the frequency of negative immigration frames used in congressional hearings. There
is a dramatic increase in the use of the Arab social identifier when discussing immigration after 9/11. As expected, this social identifier was not used
at all prior to 9/11 and was used forty-five times afterward. Overall, when
those testifying mention Arab immigrants or immigration, the presence of a
negative frame attached to it increased by a factor of 8.456, which is a 745.6
percent change in odds.
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It is interesting to note, however, that the Mexico, Central America, Caribbean, South America (also Latino or Hispanic) frame was not statistically
significant in the model. Use of this social identifier did increase by 207 percent after 9/11 but these mentions did not predict the use of negative frames.
The “Asian” social identifier was also insignificant; it was used only 26 times
prior to 9/11 and was never used after 9/11. Insert Table 5.6
The significant increase in both the amount and level of negativity of
immigration rhetoric is indicative of congressional attempts to expand the
immigration policy image to include issues of terrorism and border security.
There are 154 negative mentions of immigration by the elected officials in
the hearings we coded. In their official testimony and responses in the congressional hearings, elected members of the Congress only used 43 negative
frames about immigration prior to 9/11 (28% of the negative frames). After
9/11, there were 111 negative frames used (72% of the negative frames). This
is a 158 percent increase in negativity after 9/11.
CONCLUSION
This chapter demonstrates that the authoritarian shift in public opinion, news
coverage of immigration and presidential rhetoric, as discussed in previous
chapters, also occurred in congressional hearings. We used an exploratory
study of Senate hearings pertaining to immigration to show how the shift
transpired after 9/11 and the extent to which party identification played a
role in maintaining and expanding the authoritarian approach to immigration
policy. The policy image of immigration was expanded and maintained by
the continued use of the negative immigration framing nexus. Our research
suggests that 9/11 functioned as a shock to the immigration policy monopoly,
expanding the authoritarian approach to immigration rhetoric to include terrorism and border security in the anti-immigration framing nexus.
These findings were based on a content analysis of 1,989 mentions of
immigration in congressional hearings that took place over a ten-year period,
1995–2015, crossing September 11, 2001. From our reading of these hearings
and the expert testimony in them, we concluded that a competition for party
ownership of the immigration issue transpired in the Congress; it also appears
that both Democrats and Republicans were willing, in this time frame, to connect immigration to border security without qualification. Significant events
can garner the attention of the Congress and shape the image of topical policies
such as immigration. The Congress and the experts, through their testimonies,
have shaped the immigration narrative in a substantive manner, one that continues the negativity and authoritarian approach to how immigrants supposedly
participate in civic life, creating a persistent immigrant threat narrative. This
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dominant repertoire of immigration frames finds support from both parties and
little competition from inclusive or anti-authoritarian immigration narratives.
NOTES
1. It is important to note here that party control of the Senate had already changed
three times since January 3, 2001. Once when Vice President Al Gore was still the tie
breaker as president of the Senate. Again, after George W. Bush and Vice President
Dick Cheney are sworn in on January 20, 2001, giving the Republicans the majority
and control of the committees. Again, in early June when the Republican senator of
Vermont, Jim Jeffords, switched from Republican to Independent and said he would
caucus with the Democrats in the Senate, giving the Democrats control. Lastly, the
Democrats knew that their majority position in the Senate would be short-lived, as
a special election in Missouri was underway for the seat of Mel Carnahan who died
prior to winning his election. Even though the Senate would choose not to reorganize
after the election results on November 25 until the new session convened in January,
Democrats knew that they were going to lose their chairmanships to the Republicans
and their new majority.
2. We ran separate regressions with the same variables in the model presented
above, changing only the dependent variable, each time, to a dichotomous variable of
the type of negative frame, illegality, criminality, terrorism, and economic threat. We
did this to see if holding all other variables constant, the expert testimony of each of
the groups also increased their likelihood of using each of the frames after 9/11. When
the frames are differentiated from just any frame, the directions of the coefficients
were correct and significant for the “criminality” frame; non-elected bureaucrats and
interest groups are significantly more likely to use the “criminality” frame after 9/11.
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